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Paradox of Monetary Profit, Shortage of 
Money in Circulation & Financialisation 
 
 
Abstract: Over the last four decades, the term “financialisation” has entered economics terminologies 
to explain the development of capitalist economies in which: a) the rate of profit in the production 
sector is falling or narrowing relative to that in the financial sector b) profit seeking through financial 
speculation has grown rapidly among the household and the production sectors; c) public and private 
debt is rapidly accelerating and its ratio to GDP is increasing swiftly; d) there is an independent and 
accelerated growth of the financial sector compared to that of the real sector. This paper is a theoretical 
attempt to shed light on these features through the lens of the paradox of monetary profit and its 
manifestation in the capitalist economy, i.e. the shortage of money in circulation. The aim of this paper 
is to show how the paradox of monetary profit provides a theoretical framework to analyse the 
mechanism by which the capitalist economies move towards financialisation. This theoretical argument 
shows the connection between the shortage of money in circulation and financialisation. The core idea 
proposed in this paper is that financialisation is the direct result of the shortage of money in circulation, 
and that this shortage can be explained through the paradox of monetary profit.   
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The term “financialisation” came to economics through heterodox scholars, most notably 
(Magdoff and Sweezy, 1987), in their attempt to theorise the state of stagnation in mature 
capitalist economies by using Marx’s narrative of the evolution of capitalism. The most cited 
definition of financialisation is given by Epstein (2005; 3) who defines financialisation as “the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial market, financial actors and financial institutions 
in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. According to Magdoff (2014)1, 
Sweezy believed that the line of thought that allowed them to connect stagnation to 
financialisation was one that goes back to the works of Michal Kalecki, Josef Steindl and Paul 
Baran in the 1950s. Most current heterodox scholars do not recognise that connection anymore. 
Instead, they try to provide a modern interpretation of the term that has less connection to the 
Marx reading of capitalism and for this reason, they locate the beginning of financialisation in 
the 1980s. 
These are the two main approaches towards financialisation. The first connects the term to the 
set of neoliberal policies with regard to capital markets that was adopted by the US 
administration in the early 1980s and followed by the UK at the same time. These policies, 
then intensified by the process of globalisation which was justified by mainstream doctrine in 
support of the free movement of capital. The second approach, however, views financialisation 
in historical retrospective as a process that repeats itself in all monetary production economies, 
of which mercantilism and capitalism are respectively the first and second manifestations.  
The two approaches have several similarities in the way they look at certain applications of 
financialisation in the modern world, but they are fundamentally different in perspective. The 
first tries to find ways of correcting or changing the direction of capitalism, pushing it back 
towards a de-financialised state as a more socio-economically and politically acceptable form 
of capitalism, while the second approach does not foresee such a possibility and focuses instead 
on the historical factors behind the rise and fall of the economic and hegemonic power of 




1 Not the same Magdoff as the co-author with Sweezy. 
3 
 
Financialisation vs Financial Development:  
 
One important question must be answered before critically evaluating these two approaches, 
that is, why has the term “financialisation” not been acknowledged in mainstream literature? 
To answer this question, we need to explain the mainstream views of the role of money and 
financial institutions in the economy. Three factors are relevant here: 
1. The neutrality of money: Based on the mainstream account of the history of money, 
commodity money in the form of gold and silver was organically adopted in preference to the 
barter economy to facilitate the trade of goods and services, that is, to “eliminate the necessity 
of a happy coincidence of wants required for barter to take place. Thus, money springs forth to 
facilitate exchange by lubricating the market mechanism, which had previously relied upon 
barter: money is created to minimize transactions cost”, (Wray, 2012; 4).  
In this speculative account, which is not supported by historical facts, two issues can be 
identified: First, money and money issuers are not part of the real economy. They are the neutral 
links between real commodities or real assets. Second, money and credit are not different from 
one another but have the same functionality as a medium of exchange. An increase in money 
or credit in circulation has a nominal impact and not a real impact on economic variables. In 
this dichotomic account, it is almost forgotten that money does not create debt, while credit 
does, with its financial obligation.  
2. The passive role of financial institutions: In mainstream literature, financial institutions 
have a passive intermediary role. They are traditionally in the middle of the circular flow of 
income connecting savers to investors, either nationally (IS curve in a closed economy) or 
internationally (IS* curve in an open economy). Their functions are usefully summarized by to 
Levine (2005; 869), “financial systems produce information ex-ante about possible investments 
and allocate capital, monitor investments and exert corporate governance after providing 
finance, facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of risk, mobilize and pool 
savings and ease the exchange of goods and services.”  
In this traditional role, credit can be expanded through loanable funds the amount of which is 
constrained by and is derived from the volume of the saver’s deposits. Therefore, the volume 
of credit a bank can lend depends on the volume of deposits it receives from its customers and 
again, in this respect, there is no reason to believe that credit is different from money. 
Heterodox scholars, by contrast, believe that the causal direction is the reverse, that is, bank 
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lending leads to the formation of bank deposits not the other way around, and thus has an active 
role in the economy. (see Lavoie, 2014 and McLeay et al., 2014)   
The mainstream claim that the saver’s deposits develop the loanable funds in the economy is 
not even followed by the new central bank researchers. McLeay et al. (2014; 1) from the Bank 
of England follow the heterodox view that the saver’s deposits do not create loans, but on the 
contrary, loans make deposits: 
“… [the] majority of money in the modern economy is created by 
commercial banks making loans. Money creation in practice differs from 
some popular misconceptions — banks do not act simply as intermediaries, 
lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply 
up’ central bank money to create new loans and deposits. …  Whenever a 
bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the 
borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money. The reality of how 
money is created today differs from the description found in some 
economics textbooks: Rather than banks receiving deposits when 
households save and then lending them out, bank lending creates deposits. 
In normal times, the central bank does not fix the amount of money in 
circulation, nor is central bank money ‘multiplied up’ into more loans and 
deposits”.  
3. Market efficiency in the allocation of resources: According to the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) agents are rational and with perfect foresight as information is freely 
available for all market participants. This theory dismisses any form of abnormality or 
disproportionality in terms of profit, size, and resource allocation in the financial market. 
Mainstream scholars believe that abnormalities cannot last long in the presence of speculators 
and arbitrageurs because their activities bring any abnormality into equilibrium. Friedman 
(1953; 175) supports this view by calling speculation a stabilising factor. Any mispriced assets 
(either real or financial) will revert to their normal price and the possibility of having bubbles 
in the market is zero. According to this line of thought, any permanent increase in the size of 
the financial sector is attributable to the proportionate development of the real sector. 
Therefore, the size of the financial sector depends on the demand of the real sector for financial 
services. As Cochran pithily puts it, “like the weather, if you do not like the size of finance, 
just wait a while…. Demand that shifts out can shift back again”. (Cochran, 2013; 31 & 47) 
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The combination of these three factors leads mainstream scholars to degrade the concept of 
“financialisation” and reframe it as “financial development”, which is not only constructive as 
a term but also describes a positive contribution towards economic growth. (see King and 
Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1997).  
Heterodox Approaches to Financialisation: 
 
As mentioned earlier, two distinct approaches towards financialisation can be identified in 
heterodox literature. In this part, we briefly explain these approaches. 
▪ The First Heterodox Approach to Financialisation 
  
The first approach interprets financialisation as a new phase of capitalism, beginning in the 
early 1980s, during which many neoliberal policies were implemented to facilitate free 
movement of capital across the globe. Lapavitsas (2013; 793) correctly refers to the pressure 
of competition and the need for maintaining profitability as the main driver of these policies. 
He defines financialisation as a “systemic transformation of mature capitalist economies with 
three interrelated features. First, large corporations rely less on banks and have acquired 
financial capacities; second, banks have shifted their activities toward mediating in open 
financial markets and transacting with households; third, households have become increasingly 
involved in the operations of finance. The sources of capitalist profit have also changed 
accordingly.”, (Lapavitsas, 2011; 611). 
Epstein (2005; 3) believes financialisation, along with the rise of neoliberalism and 
globalisation, are three defining characteristics of the new era of capitalism. Stockhammer 
(2012; 48) focuses on the impact of financialisation on the behaviour of non-financial agents 
when there is a shift of power from labour to capital and also from company to shareholders. 
He believes that the process of financialisation is the result of a “finance-dominated regime of 
accumulation” which is characterised by an increase in the profit of the financial sector and the 
“sluggish growth” of investment in the real sector, along with a “polarisation of income 
distribution” that makes the economic system susceptible to financial bubbles, and eventually 
financial crisis. 
Apart from Epstein (2005, 2015), Lapavitsas (2011, 2013) and Stockhammer (2012), other 
heterodox scholars following the first approach, such as Palley (2007, 2013), Van Treeck 
(2012), Hein (2012), Orhangazi (2008), Greenwood & Scharfstein (2013), and Krippner 
(2005), locate its origins slightly earlier but limit the term to the period of the 1970s onward. 
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According to the first approach, three dimensions of financialisation are as follows:  
a) Extensive growth of the financial sector and of its ability to make a profit through 
financial instruments. Philippon & Reshef (2013) and Greenwood & Scharfstein (2013) 
have discussed this claim using various measures, such as market capitalisation, the 
share of the sector in GDP, wage distribution in the financial sector compared to the 
real sector, etc. 
b) A rise in the importance of making a profit through financial channels for non-financial 
corporations. (see Foster, 2006, 2007, 2010b) 
c) A rapid increase in the level of debt for the non-financial sector and, more specifically, 
the household sector (see Crotty, 2009; OECD, 2019) 
One of the key elements in the theory of financialisation propagated by these scholars is the 
possibility of reversing the process of financialisation. They believe de-financialisation can 
simply happen through tighter regulations, the separation of investment banking from 
commercial banking (Sweeney, 2019), democratic reformation and reorientation of the finance 
industry, and by prohibiting financial institutions from risky speculative activities and leading 
them towards their essential functionalities (Lawrence, 2016; Ulgen 2016), in one word, by 
“socialising” their activities. Lapavitsas (2013; 792) believes that the cause of financialisation 
should be examined “in the altered behaviour of the fundamental agents of capitalist 
accumulation, including non-financial corporations, banks and workers”. Therefore, it is 
possible to control all finance-related motives, actors, and markets through “democratic 
pressure”, “ the resistance of financialised citizens” and the increase of the role of state and 
syndicates in the economy (Karwowski, 2019; 1020), or by “re-establishing the command of 
the social and collective over the private and individual for the modern era”, (Lapavitsas, 2013; 
792).  
These policy recommendations, wrapped in academic terminology, are based on a very simple 
view that greed is the main cause of financialisation and should be controlled and fought by 
means of tougher rules and regulations in order to make the financial sector more suitable and 
sustainable for the economy.  
This fundamental mistake goes back to their flawed analysis of the origin of the financialisation 
process, both in terms of its source and its time of inception. First, it is accepted that one of the 
theoretical foundations of capitalism is the recognition of greed and the acceptance of self-
interest seeking. If producers should think about profit maximisation, why not bankers? It is 
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believed that a rational agent follows the principle of “the more, the better” and, if the cost is 
the same, he/she prefers to choose a basket of 10 eggs over a basket of 5 eggs, even if he/she 
does not need extra eggs. Bernard De Mandeville (“The Fable of The Bees: or, Private Vices, 
Public Benefits”, 1714), David Hume (“On The Balance of Trade”, 1752), and Adam Smith 
(“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, 1776), all tried to show 
that in a free and competitive market all self-interest & profit-seeking competitions between 
individuals even the most selfish ones, unintentionally, contributes to the public benefit.  
As far as history allows us to investigate, none of the financial services, whether provided by 
individuals or institutions, have prioritised public benefits over individual ones. Hudson (2015; 
133-134) provides many examples of such behaviours, even in the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, when financiers refused to finance the railway industry in Britain for a long time 
until they obtained monopoly ownership rights that legalised the maintenance of their “rent-
seeking privileges”.  
The search for ethical inducements directs us to think beyond capitalism. There is no way to 
fix capitalism by prioritising social/public over private preferences without also redefining the 
role of government and its power in the economy.  
Second, it is not difficult to locate the mainstream historical mindset regarding the intermediary 
role of financial institutions behind this formally heterodox analysis. Financial institutions, by 
their very nature, cannot remain in an intermediary role. They create credit and expand debt to 
make a profit and gain a bigger share of total income. Perhaps the first lesson we can take from 
economic history is that tough rules and regulations on financial institutions’ activities cannot 
be maintained permanently, and will be replaced by much laxer regulations due to the shortage 
of money in circulation in the monetary production economy, a shortage that is in turn 
exacerbated by the credit-debt reproduction mechanism2. The history of banking regulation in 
capitalist economies “is best characterized by the swinging of a pendulum, oscillating between 
the two opposing poles of greater and lesser regulation” (see Johnston, 2019). 
Third, Lapavitsas (2013; 792), a prominent scholar following the first approach, put his finger 
on the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971-1973 as the main driver of the process 
of financialisation. What he does not consider is the fact that the fixed proportion between the 
 




value of the dollar and the value of a certain amount of gold, which was the backbone of this 
agreement, could not be sustained in a monetary production economy because devaluation of 
currency is an integral part of such an economy. Therefore, the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement was not the cause, but the direct outcome of the shortage of dollars in circulation 
on a national and international scale. 
One aspect of financialisation that is discussed in detail in the first approach is its impact on 
the perception of the source of profit for non-financial companies. (see Stockhammer, 2012; 
Lapvitsas, 2013). The traditional method of extending profit for non-financial companies is 
through reduction of costs (using temporary contracts, defining efficiency per worker, avoiding 
more waste through employing machines/robots, using call options/contracts for inputs) and 
by increasing the level of income (through advertisement, competition, applying technological 
advancements, using put options/long contracts for selling, etc.). In a financialised economy, 
however, making profit through these traditional channels becomes more challenging and, in 
some cases, riskier compared to profit-seeking through financial channels. In such an economy, 
where there is separation of ownership and management, corporate managers (agents) prefer 
short-term profit through financial channels to risky profit through long-term investment.  
For corporate managers (agents), with no guarantee for their jobs and working for a limited 
number of years under the monitoring of the main shareholders (owners), it would be irrational 
to jeopardise their position by moving towards long-term investment projects when 
shareholders also need to sacrifice their short-term profit in the expectation of getting a better 
share of profit in the future, that is, for a profit that is not certain because of severe competition 
and lack of monopoly power in the market. 
 
▪ The Second Heterodox Approach to Financialisation  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the key disparities between two heterodox approaches 
is about the beginning of financialisation. While financialisation is recognised as a 
characteristically modern transformation in the first approach, scholars following the second 
approach conceptualise it as a process that began on a macro-scale with the birth of the 
monetary production economy. This has a history older than capitalism, although some 
scholars use the term “historical capitalism” which also covers the earlier period of 
mercantilism. (see Arrighi, 1994; Braudel, 1981 & 1984) 
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In this approach, financialisation is characterised by its dominative and constantly expanding 
capital accumulation process, operating in conjunction with the credit-led monetary production 
economy. Advocates of this view believe that linking the origin of financialisation to the 
neoliberal policies in the 1970s-1980s is misleading because these policies merely eliminated 
restrictions and paved the way for a more rapid expansion of financialisation, which itself “has 
deeper roots that are unrelated to neoliberalism” (Kotz, 2008; 1).  
According to this view, financialisation cannot be fully understood without examining the 
underlying capital accumulation process in its historical context. One of the pioneering scholars 
is Arrighi (1994), who introduced the concept of “systemic cycles of accumulation” for an 
economic system based on Marx’s theory of “the circuit of money capital” (M-C-M'), but with 
his own unique interpretation that differs significantly from Marx’s initial account. He believes 
the development of capitalism since the 1970s should be seen “in the light of patterns of 
recurrence and evolution, which span the entire lifetime of historical capitalism as a world 
system. Once we stretch the space-time horizon of our observations and theoretical conjectures 
in this way, tendencies that seemed novel and unpredictable begin to look familiar”3(Ibid; 4). 
He splits the M-C-M' circuit into two phases; each phase (cycle) covers a specific extended 
period. The initial phase (M-C), represents a period of “material expansion” with a specific 
regime of accumulation, distinguished by “investment in fixed capital that creates the potential 
for regular increases in productivity and mass consumption. For this potential to be realized, 
adequate governmental policies and actions, social institutions, norms, and habits of behaviour 
(the "mode of regulation") were required” (Ibid; 2). This is the phase in which capitalism can 
be identified by its specialisation in massive-scale production, investment, and trade as the 
main source of profit accumulation. But this productivity and profitability will eventually be 
weakened due to “market saturation and capitalist competition” (Robinson, 2011; 273). This 
leads to the second phase (C-M'), the period of  the “rebirth of financial capital” and its 
expansion, in which “the locus of accumulation shifts to finance capital; haute finance comes 
to dominate the hegemonic power by manipulating financial services to sustain profit making.” 
(Ibid; 273).  
 
3 This paper does not accept the idea of the “longue durée” capitalism (i.e. capitalism in its entire life) introduced 
by Braudel (1982) and used by Arrighi (1994), on the ground that the term “capitalism” cannot be attributed to an 
economic system that existed in the 13th century. For such systems, in which money and credit have had 
progressive (not dominant) roles, this paper prefers to use the term “monetary production economy”, which 
includes capitalism.    
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According to the French historian Fernand Braudel (1982), one of the key elements that should 
be considered when looking at the whole history of capitalism is that capitalists do not remain 
under any restriction and are under no obligation to follow any specific specialisation when it 
comes to profitability. They enjoy their “flexibility” and their “freedom of choice” by investing 
in any profitable project and it does not need to be in line with national or even international 
priorities. For this reason, Arrighi (1994; 5) offers another interpretation of M-C-M':   
“Money capital (M) means liquidity, flexibility, freedom of choice. Commodity 
capital (C) means capital invested in a particular input-output combination in 
view of a profit. Hence, it means concreteness, rigidity, and a narrowing down 
or closing of options. M' means expanded liquidity, flexibility, and freedom of 
choice. … Marx's formula also tells us that if there is no expectation on the part 
of capitalist agencies that their freedom of choice will increase, or if this 
expectation is systematically unfulfilled, capital tends to revert to more flexible 
forms of investment - above all, to its money form. In other words, capitalist 
agencies "prefer" liquidity, and an unusually large share of their cash flow tends 
to remain in liquid form”. 
This “eclecticism”, according to Braudel (1984; 246), happens in all capitalist economies 
through financial expansion while investment moves away from production and commerce and 
finds more profitable opportunities in financial activities. Braudel (1984; 242-246) provides 
examples of the “commission trade” and “acceptance trade”, either for buying or selling, that 
were practiced in Holland, Italy, Germany and France, and which were all based on credit 
expansion “4, 5, 10 or 15 times the specie in circulation”. He gives many examples of 
merchants from various countries who abandoned their commercial activities in order to gain 
profit from speculation and renting money, and explains how the economic power of a nation 
rises with production and commerce and then declines through the expansion of 
financialisation:    
“Was this burst of financial activity an aberration as some historians, taking 
a moral tone, have suggested? Was it not rather a normal development? 
Already in the latter part of the sixteenth century, another period when 
capital was superabundant, the Genoese had followed the same itinerary, 
as the nobili vecchi, the official lenders to the king of Spain gradually 
withdrew from commercial activity. It looks very much as if Amsterdam, 
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repeating this process, dropped the bird in hand to go chasing shadows, 
abandoning the money-spinning entrepot trade for a life of speculation and 
rentierdom, and leaving all the best cards to London - even financing her 
rival's rise. But then, did Amsterdam really have any choice? Indeed had 
the rich Italians of the sixteenth century had any choice? Was there even 
the remotest chance of stopping the rise of the North? At all events, every 
capitalist development of this order seems, by reaching the stage of 
financial expansion, to have in some sense announced its maturity: it was a 
sign of autumn”. Braudel (1984, Vol. 3; 246) 
Phillips (2006) discusses the same pattern, in Spain, the Netherlands and Great Britain in the 
16th, 18th and 19th centuries, when these leading economic powers of the time displayed their 
superiority through production and trade, but then experienced a deterioration in power when 
their financial sectors started to direct vast amount of monetary capitals towards rent-seeking 
and speculation activities. He believes that financialisation is a “sign of late-stage debilitation, 
marked by excessive debt, great disparity between rich and poor, and unfolding economic 
decline”, (Ibid; 268). Perhaps this is the main reason that leads Hudson (2003) to define 
financialisation as “a lapse back into the pre-industrial usury and rent economy of European 
feudalism”.4 
The history of capitalism in the second approach is the story of the rise and fall of some 
developed economies in which prosperity starts with production and trade but ends up with 
financial activities that do not produce any wealth but rather make bubbles through speculation 
on the existing assets. This is the situation that Keynes (1936; 103) and Strange (1986;1) called 
“casino capitalism” in which the “financial system is rapidly coming to resemble nothing as 
much as a vast casino”.  
One of the main problems with the second approach is the level of generalisation in its analysis 
of capitalism as a whole, and financialisation in particular. It downplays the importance of 
institutions and the cultural aspects of individual nations in regard to the evolution of 
capitalism, and most importantly, the speed of the financialisation process. Capitalism has 
diverse manifestations across all developed and developing nations. The Scandinavian version 
of capitalism is not readily comparable with the American version, and the Chinese version of 
what is called “state capitalism” is very different from other forms. Despite the fact that it 
 
4 Extract of interview with Hudson on 29 Aug. 2003 with the title: “Who Benefited from the Tech Bubble?”. 
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pushes all of them towards the same destiny, the speed of the financialisation process is very 
different between them. A study by Stolbova et. al (2017; 5) shows that the overall trend of 
financialisation was increasing in the Euro Area during the period of 1999-2016, that it was 
not affected by the crisis of 2008, but has not been followed at the same speed across the EU 
countries. For example, “Germany has only experienced a weak growth in financialization” 
(Ibid; 6), while the UK has experienced a faster speed toward financialisation in the same 
period. 
The main scholars in this approach, such as Braudel, Arrighi, Phillips and Hudson follow the 
“world-systems theory”, which is a multidisciplinary approach with an emphasis on history 
towards socio-economic and political issues, such as dual development between core and 
periphery countries, income inequality, imperialism, world division of labour, etc. Apart from 
the main criticisms of the world-systems theory (see Wallestein, 2004; Robinson, 2011), which 
are beyond the scope of this paper, the key problem with the theory for our purpose here is the 
fact that it does not show the exact transformation mechanism by which a productive capitalist 
system changes into a financialised system. There is almost no analytical discussion of how 
financial sectors in the mature capitalist economies grow stronger and become able to attract 
more capital than other sectors.  
This missing analytical link can be explained by the paradox of monetary profit that is the main 
contention of this paper. The paradox can explain why the process of financialisation is faster 
in some mature capitalist economies and why other economies, either developed or developing, 
are far below the financialisation status that can be seen in the US and UK. This reminds us to 
pay more attention to the speed at which the shortage of money is created  
 
The Paradox of Monetary Profit:  
 
It is almost impossible to fully understand capitalism and its transformation from a competitive 
and productive to a financialised unproductive monopoly system without questioning its source 
of monetary profit. According to Marx (1885, Vol. 2; 201), one of the opponents of the 
economist Thomas Tooke (1774 - 1858) asked him a question about the source of money for 
the realisation of profit, using the circuit of money capital (M-C-M'), but “neither Tooke nor 
anyone else has answered it so far”. It seems the paradox of monetary profit and the circuit of 
money capital (M-C-M') were renowned issues before Marx, but it was Marx who first 
13 
 
disseminated it in his theory of surplus value in the earliest German publication of Das Kapital 
in 1885.   
The paradox refers to the impossibility of the realisation of monetary profit in the capitalist 
economy from a theoretical point of view. Even mainstream scholars cannot deny the existence 
of this puzzle. Mankiw (2016; 57) shows that in neoclassical income distribution theory, 
economic profit should be zero because the total value of production should be equal to the 
total value of distributed income. Nonetheless, he tries to justify the existence of profit  by 
separating the “accounting profit” from the “economic profit”, which is consistent with the 
traditional version of capitalism in which the owner, producer, investor and beneficiary are the 
same person, and the role of credit and financial institutions in the creation of debt is 
overlooked.  
In a model of the political economy in which the total income is divided between two main 
classes, capitalists and workers, Marx (1885, Vol. 2; 204) explains the paradox as follows: 
“The capitalist class remains consequently the sole point of departure 
of the circulation of money... The capitalist class as a whole cannot 
draw out of circulation what was not previously thrown into it.” 
This means that if the total wage, in the whole system, paid to the workers is 𝑊, it would be 
impossible for the capitalists (as a class) to make a total revenue (𝑇𝑅) higher than 𝑊. This is 





In the best possible scenario workers can spend all their wages on the goods they have produced 
in the whole system. This empirically means that the capitalists as a class cannot make any 
profit unless the shortage of money for the realisation of profit is somehow financed. Thus, the 
paradox of monetary profit manifests itself in the form of a shortage of money in circulation. 
If we look at an economy as a system composed of different sectors (rather than classes as 
Marx projected in his view of the political economy), we have a similar scenario for the banks’ 
Workers Capitalists 
TR > W 
W 
Figure 1: Circular flow of income between capitalists and workers 
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profit in the financial sector, i.e. when banks lend a certain amount of money in the economy, 
given a fixed supply of money in circulation, how can they monetise their interest (profit)? 
Figure 2 shows the circular flow of financial transactions between three sectors, namely, 
household, financial and production sectors.  
               
Figure 2: Circular flow of income between household, financial and production sectors 
Bruun and Heyn-Johnsen (2009) believe that neither Marx, as the disseminator of the paradox, 
nor Keynes, who was dealt with the aggregate income determination in his General Theory, 
solved this paradox. Smithin (2016) has also claimed that the puzzle remained unanswered by 
Marx, but these claims are not true. In Volume 2 of Capital, Marx presented a practical (but 
not theoretical) solution based on the idea that the capitalist will be the final owner of the 
surplus value by putting his own money into circulation for his own consumption.  
Before discussing Marx’s practical solution, we need to be clear about the meaning of 
“theoretical” versus “practical” solution for the paradox of monetary profit. A theoretical, and 
also sustainable solution, must be able to prove that the same amount of money/credit, brought 
into and circulating in the system would be enough to monetise profit at the end of the process 
(i.e. no extra injection of money/credit is needed), regardless of whether the system is defined 
by classes or sectors. Therefore, any extra money/credit that comes into circulation for the 
monetisation of profit does not provide a theoretical, but a practical solution. 
▪ Marx’s Practical Solution for the Paradox of Monetary Profit 
In Volume 2 of Capital, Marx explains: 
“How can they [capitalists] continually draw £600 out of circulation, 
when they continually throw only £500 into it? Nothing comes out of 
nothing. … Indeed, paradoxical as it may appear at first sight, it is the 
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capitalist class itself that throws the money into circulation which 
serves for the realisation of the surplus-value incorporated in the 
commodities. But, nota bene, it does not throw it into circulation as 
advanced money, hence not as capital. It spends it as a means of 
purchase for its individual consumption. The money is not therefore 
advanced by the capitalist class, although it is the point of departure 
of its circulation”, (Marx, 1885, Vol. 2; 204) 
According to Marx, surplus value, as a value embedded in commodities, will be realised when 
capitalists put fresh/new money into circulation for their consumptions. The source of this 
money could be either their own pockets or bank credit (see Vol. 2, Ch. 17; 195 and Ch. 20; 
256). This does not mean that the capitalist pays for his/her own produced goods. It does not 
make sense to buy from yourself to make a profit. To understand the meaning of “purchasing 
for its individual consumption” let us imagine there are two capitalists A and B: capitalist A, 
who produces consumer goods and capitalist B, who produces capital goods. By bringing their 
fresh money “into circulation as a medium of circulation for their consumption” (Ch. 17; 212), 
they buy the products of each other and both capitalists are able to monetise their profits. This 
idea was summed up by Joan Robinson (1966; ix) as: “the workers spend what they get; the 
capitalists get what they spend”. [quoted from Asimakopulos (1988; 269) ] 
Although very innovative there are three issues with this solution. First, in a monetary 
production economy, the objective of production is monetary profit and not as Marx calls it 
“the surplus-value incorporated in the commodities”, which may not be monetised in the 
market. Money in such a system, according to Keynes (1933; 1), is not a “neutral link between 
transaction of real things and real assets”, but rather is a store of value.  
Marx’s solution is in contrast to M-C-M', which had been used long before him to describe the 
circuit of money capital. In sharp contrast with Arrighi’s interpretation, heterodoxy’s 
interpretation of M-C-M' is that it represents an important characteristic of a monetary 
production economy in which “production begins with money on the expectation of ending 
with more money later”, (Wray, 1999; 1). Second, in a model based on different sectors, 
capitalist consumption is already considered in household consumption, while in Marx’s model 
capitalist consumption cannot be seen without making an extra assumption.  
Third, Marx’s solution is valid if the capitalist is both the producer and the financier at the same 
time, but in a pure credit-led economy, where the producer and financier belong to separate 
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sectors, applying this practical solution means that the capitalists must accept a debt-profit 
cycle in which they must borrow more and accept another debt obligation in order to extract 
the initial profit. This can be justifiable if all capitalists increase their time horizon and chase 
the profit of the first period by keeping their optimism and incentives and carry on their 
investment for the second period of production. This was reiterated by Kalecki’s (1935; 297) 
view that “capitalists … determine … their profits by their consumption and their investments”, 
but this profit-chasing process will not be sustainable for the whole productive capitalist class.  
Despite all the above reservations, Marx introduced a very novel practical solution, one that 
has been disregarded in analysis even by the circuitists and post-Keynesian scholars who have 
claimed to find a solution for the paradox (see Renaud, 2000; Nell, 2002; Parguez, 2004; 
Messori and Zazzaro, 2005; Rochon, 2005; Keen, 2010 & 2011; Zezza, 2012). The fact must 
be accepted that the paradox does not have a theoretical solution over a circuit period and an 
extra source of money/credit is needed to form a practical solution.  
From Marx’s point of view, the source of the money needed for the realisation of profit cannot 
be endogenously generated from what was initially thrown into circulation but comes 
exogenously from the capitalists’ own pockets or bank credit. This is important specifically 
when we are dealing with a pure credit economy. In a pure credit economy, the source of money 
in circulation is credit issued by the financial sector. According to Seccareccia (1988; 51, 
quoted in Rochon, 2005; 128), even “production is a process of debt creation”. Therefore, the 
source of monetary profit for all profit-seeking sectors must be a fresh/new credit that is 
brought exogenously into circulation by financiers, without which the shortage of money in 
circulation would be exposed. This shortage cannot be seen easily in the real world because 
credit expansion covers it temporarily at the price of more debt and, eventually, more shortage 
of money in the future. 
The Connection Between The Paradox of Monetary Profit and 
Financialisation: 
 
In Chapter 23 of General Theory, Keynes (1936; 215-216) referred to the “scarcity of money” 
in talking about the monetary policy of mercantilists. He shed lights on the constant battle of 
the mercantilist economy with the shortage of money in circulation, which repetitively caused 
a high level of interest rate, on the one hand, and consequently instigated a high level of 
unemployment among farmers and other small businesses on the other. To win this battle they 
reached a specific, but also very dangerous and aggressive monetary doctrine in which the 
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solution was the continuous supply/import of gold and silver, from anywhere, into their 
economy which allowed them to print more paper money compared to their “neighbouring 
nations”. Keynes (1936; 215) quotes from Petty (1665, [published in 1691]) that the only way 
to end “the violent efforts to increase the quantity of money” is “when we have certainly more 
money than our Neighbor States (though never so little), both in Arithmetical and Geometrical 
proportion”.  
This doctrine was against Adam Smith’s (1776; Part IV) view that the wealth of a nation cannot 
be measured by the amount of gold and silver it accumulates, which was rooted in the idea of 
the neutrality of money and its functionality as the medium of exchange5. Keynes (1936; 208) 
had a different view and believed that there was an “element of scientific truth” in that doctrine.   
By highlighting historical evidence, Keynes (1930, Vol.2; 149) claims that the rise of 
civilisations and their wealth comes through enterprises and their ability to make a profit 
through their investment projects, which in turn depend on the availability of money and “the 
behaviour of the banking and monetary system”. In his historical analysis of Spain, France, and 
England, he states that the accumulation of wealth in these countries happened when more 
precious metals were in circulation and “profit inflation” was higher than “wage inflation”. 
This was the situation in Spain between 1520 to 15906, in France between 1530 to 1700 and in 
England 1550 to 1650. According to Keynes (Ibid; 158-9) “in these golden years modern 
capitalism was born”7 but with a specific characteristic that has not left us through the 
intervening centuries, namely, the shortage of money in circulation, whether it is commodity 
 
5 In Part IV of The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith shows his disbelief in the idea that “a rich country, in the 
same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country abounding in money”. He then continues: “For some time 
after the discovery of America, the first enquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown coast, 
used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be found in the neighbourhood? By the information which they 
received, they judged whether it was worthwhile to make a settlement there, or if the country was worth the 
conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk sent ambassador from the King of France to one of the sons of the famous 
Gengis Khan, says that the Tartars used frequently to ask him if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom 
of France? Their enquiry had the same object with that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was 
rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of shepherds, who are 
generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, 
therefore, according to them, consisted in cattle, as according to the Spaniards it consisted in gold and silver. Of 
the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth”. 
6 Referring to the research of Professor Earl J. Hamilton, Keynes states that “the first Aztec spoils from Mexico 
arrived in 1519 [into Spain]”. (Keynes, 1930, Vol. 2; 152) 
7 It seems that Keynes was also aware of Marx’s analysis of the link between extracting more surplus and the 
exploitation of labour as he says: “A relatively low level of real-wages is necessarily a characteristic of a period 
of Profit Inflation, because it is partly at the expense of current consumption that the abnormal growth of capital-
wealth which accompanies a Profit Inflation is derived. It does not follow, therefore, that a Profit Inflation is to 
be desired; it is a much safer conclusion that a Profit Deflation is to be avoided”. (Ibid; 162) 
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money (gold/silver), currency (backed by a fixed portion of gold/silver) or fiat currency 
(backed by nothing).  
We now have a theoretical framework to connect Keynes’s historical observations on the 
scarcity of money and Marx’s view on the paradox of monetary profit that manifests a shortage 
of money in circulation, leading us to the role of financial institutions in a simultaneous creation 
of credit and debt. These two mechanisms work together with a synergistic power: credit 
expansion, as mentioned earlier, conceals the shortage of money in circulation provisionally at 
the cost of rising debt for non-financial sectors in the future. The accumulation of debt in these 
sectors, in turn, increases the demand for money/credit and decreases the level of consumption 
and investment, which eventually raises the level of unemployment. They reproduce one 
another.  
The whirl of the credit-debt reproduction mechanism creates extra demand for money, even in 
the absence of any exogenous shock (such as war or the introduction of new technology), and 
increases its price and weight in all investment decisions at the same time, as it undermines all 
investment projects for the firms that do not have a strong balance sheet and must work under 
intense competition and uncertainty over their expected income. In the absence of any 
monopoly power (which is usually politically granted), economic agents/units cannot survive 
if they remain idle without a new investment or technological innovation, and sooner or later 
must either leave the market or accept more debt. This reproduction mechanism creates a 
situation in which the price of capital gradually becomes so expensive that the majority of 
economic agents are no longer able to invest from their own pockets. In this situation, all sectors 
rely on bank credit. A good example of this is provided by construction companies that must 
borrow to make houses and households, on the demand side, must also borrow to buy those 
houses.8 The entire system relies on the services provided by the ever-growing importance of 
creditors. They become “too big to fail”.  
The accumulation of debt for non-financial sectors leads them into massive risk. Households 
must work harder due to their debt obligations, which lowers their efficient demand, and on 
the other hand, investors facing narrower profit margins and a riskier future with no guaranteed 
 
8 According to ONS, in 1992 (Q2), the average house price for first-time buyers was £47,000, while the average 
recorded income of borrowers in that year was £18,000, that is 2.61 times higher than their yearly income. The 
figures in 2019 (Q2) are £216,000 and £48,000 respectively, that is 4.5 times higher than their yearly income. 
(see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/housepriceindexmonthlyquarterlytables1to1
9 [Last access 19/04/2020] 
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flow of income, have less incentive to expand their investment projects. This is similar to what 
Marx (1885, Vol. 2) explained as a fall in the tendency of the rate of profit in the capitalist 
economy. 
This situation provides the necessary conditions for non-financial agents to move towards 
financial activities in order to gain bigger income or profit out of their traditional channels in a 
shorter period of time, and, in some cases, to keep the company’s attractiveness in the eyes of 
money holders (shareholders and lenders). For example, many firms, even blue-chip companies 
that normally have strong balance sheets, use the stock buy-back strategy to increase the value 
of their companies in the financial market and to make their balance sheets look healthier and 
stronger in order to encourage shareholders and lenders to keep and use their money in the 
company. The idea behind the buy-back strategy is to increase the share value of a firm through 
financial activities instead of by investment in new projects or increasing real assets. Firms that 
follow this strategy can improve some financial ratios (such as returns on equity and returns on 
assets) by reducing the asset and equity side of their balance sheet, which are considered 
positive improvements by financial markets.  
Therefore, the point of departure from investment in the real sector is when capital becomes 
scarce and more expensive, which in turn makes all long-term investment decisions less 
profitable and not as justifiable. The shortage of money in circulation and the expansion of 
credit-debt as a temporary practical solution, is the beginning of the financialisation process 
that eventually leads an economy to “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue 
primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”, 
(Krippner, 2004; 174). This means that in a financialised economy the transfer happens 
automatically from M-C-M' to M-M'. 
Other Symptoms of Financialisation:  
 
The accumulation of debt and the consequent fall in demand in the real part of the economy is 
one side of financialisation, but the other side is the rise in the size and power of financial 
institutions and financial assets in the whole economy. The figures for the size of the financial 
sector in some capitalist countries that have adopted the market-based (US, UK) rather than 
the bank-based (Germany, Japan, Nordic countries) financial system indicate that 
financialisation is not just a theoretical concept. One of the measures is the percentage income 
share of the financial sector in total income, which shows a speedy growth in the US and UK 
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economies by comparison with that in the real part of the economy. For example, the figures 
derived from the Blue Book (National Account, 2019)9 shows that the percentage share of GDP 
(income approach) in the UK has increased for financial corporations from 0.9% in 1983 to 
2.7% in 2017, while the same percentage share has dropped for non-financial corporations 
(public and private) from 21.08% to 19.1% in the same period.  
There is a similar story in other economies with a market-based financial system. Greenwood 
& Scharfstein (2013) have provided details of financial services and their movements in the 
US economy. According to them, “the US financial services industry grew from 4.9% of GDP 
in 1980 to 7.9% of GDP in 2007”. They believe that the main areas of financial sector growth 
in the US can be explained by “rising asset management fees” and also rising fees in connection 
with “household credit” which was powered by the shadow banking system. Based on Pozar 
et al.’s (2010) estimate, this system in the US economy is now bigger than the traditional 
banking sector because of less regulation, while performing similar jobs to those of banks.  
Philippon and Reshef (2013) also explain two waves of US financial sector growth, from 1860 
to the 1930s and from 1950 to 2013, during which the long-run growth of the income share of 
finance is similar to that in some other countries with a well-established financial sector. A 
large part of this rapid growth in US financial services is attributed to asset management, which 
explains about 36% of the total growth as a share of GDP (Greenwood & Scharfstein,2013). 
Others, such as Goldstein et al. (2007), also point to the profit that individual brokers/dealers 
have gained through trading securities, which has given them a “degree of pricing [or 
monopoly] power”.  
This development is described by Stockhammer (2012; 50) as a deliberate “shift towards fee-
generating business rather than traditional banking that generates income as a result of interest 
differential between rates on deposits and on loans”. Considering the fact that asset 
management fees have not changed dramatically in the financial world, and in some cases have 
even fallen (see Greenwood & Scharfstein, 2013; French, 2008; Philippon and Reshef, 2013), 
the increase in total fee income reflects the increase in demand for these services. 
But it is wrong to think that the process of financialisation only happens in those countries that 
have adopted the market-based financial system. All capitalist economies move towards 
financialisation but their rate of transitions are different and that depends on the size of the 
 
9 This can be found in the reference section under the name of the editor of the collection, Steve Drew. 
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shortage of money created by their financial institutions when it is not contained by the state 
money supply. As Sawyer (2013) mentions, there are varieties of financialisation processes in 
terms of their pace and intensity across different periods and geographical regions. Based on 
the empirical study of Stolbova et al. (2017), the trend towards financialisation in the Euro 
Area in 2017 is 40% higher than it was in 1999. They also found that the economic and financial 
crisis of 2008 “has only a mild effect (or no effect at all) on this overall trend”, (Ibid; 5). This 
is in line with the definition of financialisation as an “accumulation process” in which, 
accumulation resumes even after a halt or a decline.  
The real cause for concern should not be about the movement of financial institutions towards 
generating more return/profit, but rather it should be about the lack or weakness of the 
redistribution policies when the whole system (even non-financial corporations, households or 
government) finds no better way to save the value of their assets or make a profit than to be 
actively involved in the world of finance. This can offer them risk-less returns from lending or 
speculating which in turn increases unproductive investment in the existing assets instead of in 
productive projects. The expansion of rent-seeking or speculative activities in a financial 
market should be seen as a warning sign that the financial sector is becoming more detached 
from the real sector. 
Summary: 
 
In this chapter the heterodox origin of the term financialisation was discussed, and in a critical 
analysis it was explained why this term does not appear in mainstream literature and how 
mainstream scholars still try to confine the phenomenon it describes to what they call instead 
“financial development”. 
Next, in the heterodox literature, two broad approaches to financialisation in the heterodox 
literature were reviewed. In the first approach, financialisation is interpreted as a new 
phase/stage of the capitalist economy, beginning in the late 1970s, and was accompanied by 1) 
neoliberal policies to reduce the role of government and deregulate financial systems around 
the globe, giving more roles to market forces for the allocation of resources, and 2) 
globalisation and allowing unrestricted capital movement beyond national territories. The 
followers of the first approach consider the possibility of de-financialisation through 
democratic reformation and increasing the role of government in imposing tighter regulations 
and better redistribution policies.   
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In the second approach, financialisation is interpreted in its historical context as an intensified 
and speeded up accumulation process. The followers of this approach try to find a pattern of 
financialisation in the history of capitalism. Therefore, from their point of view, financialisation 
is a recurring sequence of events that has happened already in Spain, The Netherlands, the UK, 
and the US since the 16th century. In this view, financialisation is the last stage of a capitalist 
economy which is caused by the nature of the capital accumulation process, in which a 
competitive capitalist system that makes more profit through new innovations that are then put 
into production evolves into an unproductive capitalist monopoly that makes more profit 
through financial activities.  
This study has followed the second approach but has tried to shed light on the theoretical 
connection between financialisation and the paradox of monetary profit. According to this 
study, financialisation in capitalist economies is neither a disconnected part of the capitalist 
evolution, nor a process that began only in the late 1970s. Financialisation and all its symptoms 
(features) is the direct result of a gradual accumulation process that works through the credit-
debt reproduction mechanism and that leads to a permanent and increasing shortage of money 
in circulation. Financialisation should be seen as the final stage in the dynamic of all capitalist 
economies due to the practical challenge of making a profit in a severely competitive and 
uncertain world of production when money from public channels is in short supply.  
All capitalist economies, based on their rent/profit-seeking accumulation process, reach this 
stage but at different speeds. In such an accumulation process, capital owners can gradually 
increase their share of profit, and extend their dominance over the distribution of income and 
other factors of production, through debt creation and the permanent shortage of money in 
circulation. The only factor that delays the movement towards the final stage is the public 
money supply as an alternative to the bank credit supply. But in the absence of continuous 
growth in the money supply, the expansion of credit by the same financial institutions which 
created debt in the first place leads to more shortage of money in circulation. This vicious circle 
continues until the debt is unbearable and cannot be accommodated in the system.10  
The dynamic of this credit-debt reproduction mechanism increases the role and weight of 
capital in the whole economy, and it makes an impact on the decisions of all agents (investors, 
 
10 There will be only a matter of time that a shock brings the whole system to its knees because part of the system 
will no longer be able to participate in a new debt contract. This discussion is out of the scope of the current paper 
but it deserves to be considered as an alternative theory that can explain capitalist crises through the connection 
between financialisation and the paradox of monetary profit. 
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producers, households, and government) with regard to investment, production, consumption, 
and taxation11. By increasing the role and weight of capital in the economy, the tendency 
towards making a profit without investment and production becomes prevalent, as profit can 
be made much more easily through the financial channels, where the risk is justifiable 
compared to the uncertainty of making a profit through a long-term investment commitment, 
when there are fewer profitable opportunities (as the rate of profit is generally falling and 
competition brings the profit margins down) and incentives for new investment are low. 
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